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Abstracl
Distributing digiwl media contents to a large number of
users in a cost-effective manner is a challenging task for
the content provider. Traditionally, the content provider
either deploys a set of high capaciry servers or contracts a content delivery network (CDN) to transport
contents to users. The first approach requires a significant investment to set up and administer the servers.
While in the second approach the CON charges the
provider for every megabyte served. For large fi les such
as movies, both approaches burden the budget of the
content provider. For instance, the limited deployability of video on demand services may be attributed, in
part, to the cost factor.
Motivated by the success of the peer-lO-peer (P2P)
paradigm in the last few years and by the immense
number of the often underutilized end systems con·
nected to the Internet. we propose a collaborative P2P
infrastructure for cost-effective content distribution.
The objectives of this position paper are: (1) To highlight the economic potential of a content distribution
system built on lOp of a P2P infrastructure, and (2) To
identify the key research problems that need to be addressed in order to realize this economic potential.

1 Introduction
Consider a content provider who is intereslcd in distributing digital media contents (e.g.. music files,
movies, documents) to a set of potenlial clients. Currently, lWO approaches are being used to distribute contents to clients: direct and third-pany. In the direct
approach, the content provider deploys and manages a

set of servers with capacity commensurate to the expected demand from clients. To enhance performance
(in terms of, e.g., short delay and small loss ratio) a
third-party is involved to "deliver" contents to clients.
This third-party is known as a Contenr Delivery Network (CDN). Content delivery networks, such as Akamai and Digital Island, deploy thousands of servers at
the edge of the Internet. (Akamai deploys 10,000+
servers.) These servers (also called caches) are installed at many POPs (point of presence) of major ISPs
such as AT&T and Sprint. The idea is to keep the contents close to the cI ients. and hence traffic traverses
fewer network hops. This reduces the load on the backbone networks and yields a better service. The CON
typically caches the contents at many servers and redirects a client to lhe most suitable server. Proprietary
protocols are used to distribute contents over caches,
monitor the current traffic situation over the Internet,
and directs clients to caches. Cost-effectiveness is a
major concern in both of these approaches. especially
for distributing large files such as movies. For instance,
CDN charges the content provider for every megabyte
served. which might be acceptable for relatively small
files such we as web pages with some images.
We envision a collaborative content distribution infrastructure centered around the peer-to-peer (P2P)
paradigm. Instead of deploying powerful caches at
many locations, the P2P model relies on resource contribution from peers (client machines). Every peer may
contribute a IiHle. but there is an enormous number of
them. The P2P approach strives to push the contents
even closer to the clients: contents are obtained from
fellow peers within the same network domain. The

collaborative P2P model can be used in two seuings.
First, it can server as a sllbsrrate through which content
providers disseminate contents to clients by employing
and aggregating resources from participating peers. In
this case, coment providers should motivate peers to
contribute resources to the system. Second, it can be
used as an infrastructure for a cooperative sharing of resources and contents among peers. A cooperative filesharing syS(em is an example for the second case. In
this case, incentive mechanisms should be developed to
ensure fair contribution and consumption of resources
The collaborative P2P model has the potential to create substantial value in a cost effective manner. compared to a system where no such sharing occurs. However, realizing this pOlential is a challenging task. First,
how to optimally create and disseminate information
resources in a network among a large number of distributed participants with stochastic and dynamically
changing demand and supply is a hard enough problem, even for a central "system manager" with complete information about the preferences and full control of actions of all panicipants. Second, this problem
is funher complicated by the fact that participants are
autonomous and self-interested economic agents (individuals or firms) whose own incentives and objectives
are typically not aligned with those of the overall system. Furthermore, participants have private information about their own preferences and other imponam
variables that impact the system behavior. Hence, the
success of collaborative information sharing requires
mechanisms that coordinate the actions of its participants such that they increase the value of the system.
Before we present the research problems, we describe the similarities and differences between the economic issues in collaborative information systems and
transmission services in data networks.

1.1

of the economic characteristics of collaborative information sharing: both involve the transmission of various media types with heterogeneous quality requirements over congestion-prone computer networks, connect many independent, spatially dispersed and selfinteresled users who are sensitive to quality of service
and whose consumptions create externalities. Howcver,
it is imponant to emphasize that collaborative information sharing poses some fundamentally new and different challenges. (1) In data transmission pricing, users
arc typically only consumers of the resources. By contrast, in collaborative information sharing, the peers
are both consumers alld sJfpplier.~ of comelU alld resources. (2) Even though the Internet is managed by
independent service providers, its supply infrastructure
is nevertheless much more aggregated than is the case
in collaborative infonnation sharing where each panicipant who supplies system resources is an independent
agent. In this sense, PZP systems are "completely de·
centralized"; their available infrastructure and the location and quantity of the information they carry are subject to the decisions of a much larger number of smaller
entities than in data transmission systems. (3) The
work on data transmission pricing focuses on the provisioning and allocation of a givell set of resources LO
a given set of demand functions for data transmissions
between a given source and destination. By contrast, in
collaborative information sharing, the set of available
resources and their capacities are fUflctions of peers'
decisions, the demands for transmissions arefimctiolls
of how much content is made available for sharing. and
the source-destination(s) pairs are filllctiolls of peers'
sharing choices, network locations and the mechanism
for matching supplying peer(s) LO client peers.

2 Research Problems

Economics of Data Transmission versus The goal of our research is to desigll alld test economic
mechallisms that yield highly perfonnillg collaborative
Collaborative Information Systems
illfanllatiall sharillg systems: they should be at least
economically viable, and ideally economically attractive. for all participants. To that end, we need to develop a systematic understanding of how system behavior depends on (1) the technological properties of the
system, (2) the incentives of the economic agents that
control their resources, and (3) the mechanisms that are
in place. Specifically, the following research problems
need to be resolved in order to realize the collaborative

The design and pricing of data transmission services
in networks emerged in the mid-1990s with the commercialization of the Internet (see for example [2, 7.
ID. 12, 16, 17, 21]). It typically focuses on how to
design price-service mechanisms that optimally allocate a capacity-constrained and therefore congestionprone network to given customer demands for lransmissian services. Data transmission services share some
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model for content distribution.

2.1

get paid, their decision to cache may depend on more
sublle factors such as their "forecast of demand" for
the cached materials. In a multi-product environment,
a peer may prefer to only cache whal she perceives to
be lhe most popular and therefore the most lucrative
content, even though this may not be in line with the
overall system objective.
This makes the provisioning problem more challenging because we need 10: (I) understand pecrs behavior and more specifically their valuation of their own
capaciry, (2) study how (hc system performance depends not only on the aggregate capacity but also on the
heterogenous contributions from individual peers, (3)
analyze the interaction between the provisioning and
matching algorithms, and (4) design an incentive mech·
anism to integrate the above issues into a provisioning
algorithm that optimizes a system-wide objective funclion.
The fact that agents are distributed and have a considerable amount of privale information also raises the
question of how centralizcd the mechanism should be.
Adding (he critical computational tractability issue, the
problem becomes a distributed algorithmic mechanism
design (DAMD), whereby the agents, the relevant information, and the computation of the mechanism are
distributed. Examples of DAMD in the data transmission setting include [8] and [9].

Defining Economic Performance Objectives

First of all, the economic performance objectives of the
collaborative system have to be clearly defined. These
may include: (I) maximize the .rystem benefit, or aggrc·
gate utility minus cost. This aggregate metric typically
rcsults from more specific objectives, including, (2)
large variety (selection) and high recency of available
information content, (3) high qualiry of service delivery, (4) high consumption (sharing) levels of available
information, and (5) low incremental cost of deploying
the sharing infrastrucrure. In addilion, it may be im·
portant to evaluate the di.\·lribll/ioll of bellefits among
client peers, supplying pecrs, and other relevant participant groups.

2.2 Mechanism Design for Information Network Provisioning
We define network provisioning as the process of creating and distributing information resources among supplier peers in preparation for client requests. This definition bears some similarities with the replication problem addressed by Choen and Shenker [6]. The authors
propose optimal replication strategies that minimizes
the expected search size in an unstructured P2P environment. They prove that replicating objects in proportion to the square·root of their query rates yields
the minimum expected search sizc for locatable items.
However, lhe replication strategies assume "full co·
operation" from peers, in the sensc that a peer voluntarily commits some of its capacity to the system
and follows the prescribed protocol for replicating ob·
jects. Peers of this nature fall in the obedient nodes
category in the classification given by Shneidman and
Parkes [20] and Feigenbaum and Shenker [9]. The obedienl nodes along with faulty nodes-those that may
stop working (fail stop), drop messages, or act arbitrarily (Byzamine)-are the rypical nodes used in the
distributed systems literature. In contrast, nodes in
P2P systems are found to be economically rarional or
utility-maximizing agents [20, 9]. Unless properly in·
centivised, nodes may deviate from the prOlocol or not
participate at all. In the replication problem, if peers
are not paid for sharing data, they may not have an incentive to cache data for subsequent sharing. If they do

2.3 Mechanism Design for Matching Client
and Supplier Peers
The problem of matching client requests with supplier
peers can be viewed as a complex routing problem. Unlike in standard routing, here the destination is [0 be endogenously determined as a function of the incentives
of clients (e.g., price, content and service quality), suppliers (e.g., current vs. fulure revenue opportunity, resource consumption of fulfilling request) and those of
the overall system (e.g., value of request vs. negalive
externalities on service quality of competing requeslS).

2.4

Mechanism Design for Joint Provisioning
And Matching

The next task is to study how the provisioning and
matching mechanisms interact and 10 search for mechanism pairs that perform well together. This search
will give special consideration to mechanisms that link
3

a peer's case of access to others' resources to her willingness to share her own.

be used to categorize the market and network environment.

2.5 Study of P2P System Macro Structure and
Behavior

3

The provisioning and matching mechanisms arc likely
to impact how a network forms and behaves. This
raises interesting fundamenral questions about the relationship between the macro behavior of the system and
the behavior of its individual components. From this
perspective, collaborative information sharing systems
can be viewed as complex systems [I8], whose study is
creating significant interest in various branches of the
physical and social sciences. A number of interesting
open questions can be asked about the macro structure
and function ofP2P systems that emerge in such decentralized fashion: How do they compare to those that are
obtained by centralized design? What can be said about
their dynamics? Do they converge to certain structural
and functional patterns? If so, how stable are these patterns and how "organized" do they appear to be? These
questions may well uncover interesting links between
the structure of collaborative information sharing systems and their economics: for example. how concentrated are the peers and is the content in a system that
has reached steady-state? Does the resulting structure
of supply and demand reflect a high degree of market
power for a small number of large peers, or do all peers
control a comparable amount of resources? How do the
answers depend on the mechanism design and on key
features of the participants?

Related Work

The economic aspects of peer"to-peer systems have reccived litlle attention so far. Previous research appears to mainly focus on the free riding problem,
whereby only a small fraction of peers contribme resources into the system. Free-riding has been shown by
[1] (through a measurement srudy) and [II] (through
game-theoretic analysis). Using a model of user behavior and empirical data collected from OpenNap networks, [3] shows that free-riding increases with the size
of the P2P network. a known phenomenon in the public goods setting [13. 19]. Free riding threatens the future of P2P systems by stifling the growth of the system capacity and the variety and volume of sharing.
Researchers of [II] and [I] advocate the use of payment mechanisms that motivate the peers with incentives to contribute to the system. In [111, the authors
construct a game theoretic model of P2P systems and
srudy user equilibria under different paymem mechanisms thal the system offers the peers, such as micropayments, points-based. and rewards for sharing. By
contrast, [IS] focuses not on peers' incentives but on
those of the central authority in file-sharing services
such as Napster that are centrally managed. They propose how peers should pay the central entity to motivate
2.6 Comparison of P2P Systems with Key Al- it to make clients aware of their content. To prevent the
ternatives
problem of content piracy, [14] proposes a system architecture that uses economic incentives instead of tamThe objective of this task is to systematically compare
per resistance protocols and motivates users to keep the
the economic and operational perfonnance ofP2P syscontent within the subscription community.
tems with those of key alternatives, including content
distribution networks. A comparison framework that
In summary, existing economic studies of P2P sysidentifies key economic and operational perfonnance tems give partial, mostly qualitative, insights into some
metrics as well as metrics that categorize the market of the incentives that drive peers' behavior in collaboand network environment need to developed. The eco- rative information sharing. and they explore some parnomic and operational performance metrics may in- tial solllfio//s. However, since they abstract away imclude: expected provider profits. cost effectiveness, portant lechnological features of the network environcustomer benefits, system stability, and service quality. ment within which peers operate, these studies are not
While the geographical dispersion of potential users, equipped to provide a systematic understanding of how
concentration of capacity bottlenecks in the delivery a P2P system behaves depending on the technical and
infrastructure, and naLUre of data to be distributed can economic mechanisms that govern its operation.
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Conclusion

[9J J. Feigenbaum and S. Shenker. Distributcd algorithmic mechanism design: Recenl results and future directions. In Sixt', Imemational Workshop 011 Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Compl/ling
and Gommwricatiolls (DIAlM'02), Atlanla, Georgia,
September 2002. ACM Press.

In this position paper, we introduced the idea of a collaborative infrastructure for content distribution, which

relics on aggregating resource comrihutions from the
participants in the system. We argued that the collabo-

[10] R. Gibbcns and F. Kelly. Resource pricing and Ihe
evolution of congestion control. Alftomarica, 35: 19691985,1999.

rative model has the pmcmial to create substantial value

in a cost-effective manner. We also presented the research challenges facing (he model. These challenges
mainly include designing incentive-compatible algo-

[11] P. Golle, K. LeyllOn-Brown, and I. Mironov. Incentives for sharing in peer-Io-peer net\vorks. In Proc.
of Second workshop Oil Electrollic COlllmerce (WELCOM'OJ), Heidelberg, Germany, November 2001.

rithms for: replicating infonnation resources among
suppliers, matching clients with the appropriate suppliers, and the interaction between the replication and the
structure behavior of the collaborative model and comparing it versus its alternatives.

[12] A. Gupta, D. Stahl, and A. WhinL~on. A stochastic
equilibrium model of internet pricing. Ecol/omic Dynamics alld Colltrol, 21:697-722, 1997.
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